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ABSTRACT 
The paper focuses on the decision-making process in the European Union 
since approval of the Treaty of Maastricht. Special consideration is dedicated to 
pillars two and three. The second pillar is connected with Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, while the third pillar contributes with Justice and Home Affairs. 
The first part of this paper introduces the major tools which are commonly used 
and describes how pillars system works. The difference between intergovernmen-
talism and supranationalism is also addressed. In the second part the paper deals 
with some important changes under the Treaty of Nice and Treaty of Lisbon. The 
Treaty of Lisbon will cancel the pillars system, being replaced by one legal 
personality for the European Union. While the former treaties were partly based 
on intergovernmentalism, the Treaty of Lisbon is mostly oriented on supranatio-
nalism.     
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
1. Introduction 
 
The Treaty of Maastricht has meant a shift towards the supranational 
character of the Community. But together with the separation of new agenda 
of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs 
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(JHA), which are forged on the structure of Schengen Agreement, the inter-
governmental principles of decision-making in this area have been retained.1  
The three pillars of Maastricht Treaty rose from the texts, which had estab-
lished the European Community. The main differences are in the level of suprana-
tionality, which is measured by the mechanism of decision-making. In the first pillar 
the competitions of legislation initiator were left by the supranational European 
Commission. Decision-making in the Council of Ministers is typically made by a 
majority of votes.2 This agenda includes common trade, agriculture and transport 
policy, as well as common currency, the EU citizenship etc.3  
The second pillar includes the newly defined Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). The main reason for this is to focus on the problems of security, 
defence, human rights and foreign policy.4 In these cases a consensus is needed 
for a final decision. The member states have become the main initiators of new 
activities, together with the Commission (Hor~i~ka, Kovár, 2005, p. 121). The 
same situation is seen in connection with the third pillar, which focuses on the 
Justice and Home Affairs.  
 
 
2. Instruments of the Pillars Two and Three 
  
After the Treaty of Maastricht had been approved, the main interest fo-
cused on the second and third pillars. These fields defined the new aims of the 
Community.5 According to the Treaty, the aims were limited by the inter-
governmental forms of decision-making. Nevertheless it moved the Commu-
nity towards the development of other forms of integration.6  

1 The Treaty of Maastricht was signed by Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the United King-
dom, Portugal, Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland (Kap-
teyn – Verloren van Themaat, 1998, p. 38). 
2 To the first pillar belongs for example Customs union, Single market, Common Agriculture 
Policy, Social Policy etc. Further see http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/maastricht_en.htm 
(13. 4. 2009). 
3 For more see http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/maastricht_en.htm  (13. 4. 2009). 
4 The other reason was to adopt system of intergovernmentalism in this area (Hartley, 1998, 
p. 24). 
5 Due to it the system was divided on the three pillars. Sometimes it is also called the Maas-
tricht temple (Fiala – Pitrová, 2003, p. 128 – 129).  
6 For more information about intergovernmentalism see the  next chapter.  
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 Joint actions and common position were defined as the main tools for 
politics realization in both pillars. In many cases they were approved by the 
unanimous decision of member states in cooperation with the Commission 
and the European Parliament (Krej~í, 2001, p. 217). For the CFSP, the Euro-
pean Council was set as the main coordinator and the Council of Ministers 
unanimously approved common positions achieved. A draft could be sug-
gested by each member state or by Commission, as well as the European 
Parliament. The Chairman of the Council had to consulate the European Par-
liament on all aspects and alternatives for CFSP and then inform Commission 
of the results.7  
 The CFSP can be divided into two parts. The first focuses on foreign pol-
icy, which advances the European Political Cooperation8 and the second in-
volves defence matters (Craig, De Búrca, 1999, p. 169). Defence issues made 
the most important contribution to integration. The Treaty of Maastricht clearly 
states that the European Union wants to deepen relations with the Western 
European Union and cooperate through it within Nato.9 The Western European 
Union was also asked to work on the actions and decisions of the European 
Union in the field of defence (Fiala, Pitrová, 2003, p. 550). 
 The third pillar of the European Union focuses on the Justice and Home 
Affairs. This was marked as a sector covering the common interests of the 
member states in asylum policy, immigrant policy, the fight against organized 
crime and cooperation in justice and customs area (Craig – De Búrca, 2007, p. 
18). The development of third pillar was a reaction to rising crime after the 
Schengen system was set up in 1985.10 The main tool of the JHA was the 
founding of the common police office EUROPOL.11     
 
 
 

7 See further http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/zahranicni_vztahy/evropska_unie/spolecna_zahranicni 
_a_bezpecnostni/ spolecna_zahranicni_a_bezpecnostni_1.html (15. 4. 2009). 
8 European Political Cooperation was set up in 1970 as a precursor of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (Hartley, 1998, p. 24).  
9 NATO-EU cooperation is also progressing at a deeper level. One reason is, that 21 states 
are members of both organizations. See further: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm#evolution (16. 4. 2009).  
10 The Schengen Agreement eliminated internal borders between the signatory states. For 
more see http://www.euroskop.cz/290/sekce/r-s/ (18. 4. 2009).  
11 http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=facts (18. 4. 2009).  
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3. Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism  
 
Decision-making on the base of intergovernmentalism is typical of the 
second and third pillars. In comparison with supranationalism, used for the first 
pillar, intergovernmentalism is mostly based on a unanimous method of voting. 
The main reason for this is to protect the national interest of the member 
states. This system of voting is therefore mainly used for the areas of foreign 
policy, security policy or law. The same system is also used in the European 
Union (Nugent, 2006, p.565).     
On the other hand, supranationalism features the most effective system 
of voting. In this case it is sufficient to find a majority to approve a draft. Since 
the Treaty of Maastricht came into force in 1993, everything except the CFSP 
and JHA has been approved using this model (Nugent, 2006, p. 558).  
The difference between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism can 
be seen within the European institutions. While the European Commission or 
European Parliament are part of the supranationalism system, the European 
Council functions through intergovernmentalism.12    
 
 
4. Decision-making under Pillar Two  
 
As stated above, the second pillar includes the Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy. This area is one of the most controversial in the European Union. 
Differences in opinions between the member states on the one side and the 
requirements for common positions led to the final decision to set up a spe-
cific pillar. The first step was made in 1970 with the European Political Coop-
eration, but the real leap was made with the Treaty of Maastricht.13  

12 It’s also depends on the subject being addressed and the specific section it falls under.  
13 To the list of the all important treaties see http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/index_en.htm (20.  
4. 2009). 
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The main events influencing improvements in the CFSP were the wars in 
the Persian Gulf and in former Yugoslavia.14 During the 1990s the member 
states and the European institutions started consultations on the need for re-
forms in the area of the CFSP. The result of these consultations was part of 
the Amsterdam Treaty.15 This treaty created a new office of High Representa-
tive for the Common Foreign and Security Policy which Javier Solana* held 
from 1999.16 This change has helped to improve the system of decision-
making in the second pillar. It has brought more flexibility to decision-making 
on foreign and security affairs questions. The European Union can be active in 
humanitarian operations, as well as in peacekeeping operations (Fiala, Pitrová, 
2003, p. 564). Cooperation in field of common troop capacities was also 
strengthened.17  
The main aim of the CFSP is to cover the common values, interests and 
security of the European Union and the member states. This should all be en-
sured by the consultations and cooperation of diplomatic offices of member 
states and the European institutions. The special role plays two main tools – 
joint actions and common positions (Nutall, 2000, p. 257 – 264). The main dif-
ference between them is that the common positions define the positions of 
the EU on foreign policy and are obligatory for all member states. The joint 
actions are on the other hand tools enabling the EU’s active participation, like 
sanctions on non-members countries or observers during elections (Hor~i~ka, 
Kovár, 2005, p. 126 – 127). In the Treaty of Maastricht the European Council 
was appointed as the main CFSP coordinator. The European Council must, 
according of the Treaty, cooperate with the state holding the rotating presi-
dency.18 On the other hand the Treaty also made the Council of Ministers19 the 

14 The war in Persian Gulf started in 1990 due to an unexpected occupation of Kuwait by 
the Iraqi troops. The war in the former Yugoslavia started then in 1991 after the federation 
had started separating a year ago (Veselý, 2007, p. 543 – 549).  
15 The Amsterdam Treaty was signed in October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 
1999. See further http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/index_en.htm (22. 4. 2009).  
16 For specific information about Mr Javier Solana and Office of High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy see http://ue.eu.int/App/solana/default.aspx? 
lang=EN&cmsid=246 (22. 4. 2009).  
17 The discussion whether to establish a European army has not yet been resolved.  
18 The state holding the rotating presidency formally presides over the EU for 6 months. 
The presidency at present, in April 2009, is held by the Czech Republic. Slovenia held it from 
January to June 2008.  
19 The Council of Ministers is the principal decision-making institution. It has legislative 
codecision competence with the European Parliament. There are different Councils such as 
ministers of foreign affairs (GAERC) or ministers of finance (ECOFIN) etc. Between sessions 
of the Council, there is working COREPER which is represented by the ambassadors to the 
EU. Under qualified majority voting each state has different voting weight. The largest are 
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institution responsible for decision-making in this area, via unanimously ap-
proval for joint actions and common positions (Craig, De Búrca, 1999, p. 99).  
From the point of view of many analyses, the main focus of the second 
pillar was concentrated on the using of tools and system of decision-making. 
The tools can be generally divided according to their effects. The first concen-
trated on the systematic cooperation – common positions; and the second on 
the pursuit of the CFSP – joint actions (Fiala, Pitrová, 2003, p. 552 – 553).  
The role of the European Parliament must also be remembered. This insti-
tution should have control, if all decisions were really applied in practice. The 
main rule was that the President of the Council had to consult the European 
Parliament on all aspects of the CFSP. The European Parliament could also 
give the Council recommendations or question it (Hartley, 1998, p. 34).  
The experience with the second pillar, according to the Treaty of Maas-
tricht, showed that there were many weaknesses in the CFSP. This led the EU 
member states to reform the second pillar. The result of this was the Amster-
dam Treaty, which was approved in 1999.20 This new treaty retained the sys-
tem of pillars which was launched in the Treaty of Maastricht while it made the 
CFSP more integrated and more effective (Peterson, Sjursen, 1998, p. 10).   
The Amsterdam Treaty, of course, more specified the role of common 
positions and joint actions. The common position was defined as concrete EU 
position to the thematic or geographic matters. The joint action was then to 
describe the steps which should direct to the solutions of specific situations, 
where the action of EU is necessary (Krej~í, 2001, p. 222). The Amsterdam 
Treaty also defined a new tool – common strategy. The common strategy was 
supposed to activate EU in the matters where all the member states had im-
portant common interests. The common strategies are approved by the Euro-
pean Council on the base of a Council of EU recommendation. The Council of 
the EU then implements the strategy through common positions and joint 
actions (Craig, De Búrca, 1999, p. 106).      
The decision-making mechanism in the second pillar was also reformed 
on the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty. A special form of voting was accepted in 
addition to the common strategy. Its working name is constructive absence. In 
other words it means that the member states received the possibility to disagree 

Germany, France, Italy and UK with 29 votes. The smallest is Malta with 3 votes. Slovenia 
has 4 votes and the Czech Republic 12.  
20 For the Treaty see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html (29. 4. 
2009).  
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with concrete activity in CFSP, while not blocking the decision by veto (Bretherton, 
Vogler, 1999, p. 39). The Treaty states that a Council member can abstain from 
voting according to Article 23 of Amsterdam Treaty.21 If a state exercises the 
right to abstain and the decision is approved, all member states must accept it 
as a decision of the EU (Fiala, Pitrová, 2003, p. 564 – 565).  
The use of the constructive absence is predicated on application of Article 
23 of Amsterdam Treaty by a limited number of member states. According to 
the Treaty this article can only be used by states, whose total vote in Council is 
less the one-third of all votes of member states in the Council.22 If more states 
decide to use the constructive absence and this limit will be exceeded, then 
the decision is not passed.23  
Furthermore, in the Amsterdam Treaty the unanimous voting system was 
retained for the CFSP. Article 23 of Amsterdam Treaty states that it is possible 
to use the qualified majority vote when the Council approves a joint action, 
common positions or makes any other decision based on the common strat-
egy (Smith, 2008, p. 44). The use of qualified majority is not common and 
automatic, since the Treaty also states that this process can be stopped at any 
point.24 If a member of the Council declares that due to national interests it will 
vote against, the voting is postponed. The final decision can be then reached 
by the European Council (Fiala, Pitrová, 203, p. 565).  
The important institutional changes brought in by the Amsterdam Treaty 
included constituting the office of High Representative of Common Foreign 
and Security Policy.25 The High Representative cooperates with the rotating 
presidency. He leads negotiations with non-member countries, if empowered 
by the Presidency.26 But from the institutional point of view the European 
Council is responsible for the CFSP. The Council of Ministers is therefore re-
sponsible for unity, cohesion and operation (Fiala, Pitrová, 2003, p. 568).     
When the Amsterdam Treaty was in preparation, the main questions 
raised concerned relations between the first and second pillars. The unclear 
position of the European Commission was the main issue. On one hand, the 

21 See further http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html#0135040040 
(3. 5. 2009). 
22 See further http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html (5. 5. 2009).  
23 See ibid.  
24 See ibid.  
25 This position is sometimes referred to as Monsieur PECS (from the French original: 
Politique Étrangère et de Sécurité Commune). 
26 See further http://www.eu2009.cz/en/eu-policies/general-affairs-and-external-
relations/general-affairs-and-external-relations-595/ (9. 5. 2009).  
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Commission is responsible for the CFSP in cooperation with the Council; on 
the other, it has no tools to influence policy (Hor~i~ka, Kovár, 2005, p. 127).
The only noticeable change was the institutionalization of the office of High 
Representative.   
In the Amsterdam Treaty there was also a focus on the voting mechanism 
and decision-making. The most important change has been the institution of 
constructive absence mechanism. The Amsterdam Treaty has also reached the 
possibility of voting by qualified majority in area of CFSP. But before using this 
rule the European Council has to find a consensus. The joint actions and com-
mon positions are going out of the common strategies, which must be ap-
proved on the base of consensus.27  
It also cannot be decided according to qualified majority, if a member 
state’s considers its national interests are threatened (Smith, 2008, p. 44). 
 
 
5. Decision-making under Pillar Three 
 
The issues of Justice and Home Affairs belong to newer problematic of 
European integration. The main area was made via the Treaty of Maastricht, 
where the freedom of movement has been guaranteed.28 Before that we could 
observe two lines of development. The first one was focused on intergovern-
mental cooperation of member states Ministers of Interior and Ministers of 
Justice under the working group which was called TREVI.29 The second one 
was made by the activity of narrow group of member states which decide to 
go on in integration of free movement and signed the Schengen Agreements 
in 1985.30  This Treaty created an area without internal borders between the 
signatory states (Kapteyn, Verloren van Themaat, 1998, p. 697).  
The development of both lines was in parallel. In both cases one could speak 
of intergovernmental cooperation. When the Treaty of Maastricht was signed, 

27 For further information see above.  
28 See further http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html(14. 5. 2009).  
29 TREVI means (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme, Violence internationale).  
30 The Treaty was signed by Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. 
Today 22 member states, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and the microstates participate on 
this Agreement. 
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both systems were institutionalized by the third pillar (Fiala, Pitrová, 2003, p. 608), 
but one still could not talk of a unified system. The point of intersection was set 
up after the Amsterdam Treaty was created. Since this time both lines have 
been connected and the Schengen Agreements have become part of the EU 
Treaties (Steverson, 2007, p. 79).  
The Treaty of Maastricht clearly defined the area of common interests, 
which was the part of third pillar. It chiefly addresses the problems of asylum 
policy, external borders and immigration policy, fighting against drugs dealers, 
custom cooperation or cooperation of police against the terrorism and organized 
crime (Hartley, 1998, p. 26).  
Decision-making in the third pillar starts with the proposal of an initiative 
to the Council. According to the Treaty of Maastricht, the draft can be prepared 
by member states or by the European Commission (Craig, De Búrca, 2007, p. 
126), but the European Commission has the right to reject initiatives. In the 
areas of court cooperation, customs cooperation and police cooperation the 
member states are only entitled to propose a draft (Fiala, Pitrová, 2003, p. 
609).  The Council acquired the power to adopt common positions, common 
procedure and then propose the final version of agreements (Craig, De Búrca, 
1999, p. 112 – 113). The common position was the first tool to be created to sup-
port cooperation rulings to achieve EU aims. The common position should have 
been advocated by the member states in the international organizations. Before 
that it had to be unanimously approved by the Council (Hartley, 1998, p. 40). 
The common procedure which was not clearly defined was also adopted 
unanimously but the Council could opt to use a qualified majority system (Hart-
ley, 1998, p. 41). The measures of effecting of common procedure were ap-
proved by qualified majority, in other words by the majority of two-thirds 
member states.   The Treaty of Maastricht also set up the coordinator commit-
tee which consisted of higher officers (Hor~i~ka, Kovár, 2005, p. 127). The 
main reason of this step was the requirement to prepare statements to the 
Council. The President of the Council has to regularly consult the Parliament on 
third pillar issues. The Parliament can also interpellate the Council, as well as offer 
recommendations.31 
Because of the intergovernmental system of third pillar, the Treaty on EU 
constitutes a major legislative act that regulates the process of responsibility of 
member states for law and order (Fiala, Pitrová, 2003, p. 615). The third pillar 

31 See further: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/public/staticDisplay.do?id= 
46&pageRank =3& langure =EN (18. 5. 2009). 
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should also not be a barrier to cooperation on the bilateral or multilateral 
level.32  
Significant attention was also paid to the principles of democratic control. 
This was more important in the third pillar then in the first and second pillar. 
The reason this was so important was the issue of processing the personal 
data of citizens. In this case the European Parliament was appointed to check 
on the Council and the Commission. Both institutions were also required to 
notify the Parliament in relation to third pillar matters.33 Part of this agenda also 
came under auspices of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg.34  
The area of Justice and Home Affairs was the most important part of all 
changes in Amsterdam Treaty. The reform which the Treaty brought better 
categorized, the agenda of third pillar and a part of this agenda shifted to the 
first pillar.35 For this change the transition period of five years was set and the 
agenda was renamed as a Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters 
(PJCC). Under the third pillar remained only area of Judicial and Police coopera-
tion (Archer, 2008, p. 54). The Amsterdam Treaty revised the tools which had 
been used before. The Council can draw up common positions, general deci-
sions, and decisions or prepare a number of other documents. The innovation 
came with general decisions and decisions.36  
The general decisions are defined in the Treaty as a specific act which is 
approved for the coming the law and acts of the member states together. Ac-
cording to the Treaty they do not have primary influence and they are obliga-
tory only in results which should be achieved. But it does not matter which 
tools are used. This falls within in the remit of the member states (Fiala, 
Pitrová, 2003, p. 621). The decisions, on the other hand, are approved for any 
purpose that does not contravene the principles of the Treaty. The decisions 
are obligatory and do not have direct effect.37  

32 It means that the member states can cooperate in specific way together in accordance 
with EU Law. 
33 For the further information about the relation of European Parliament and other institu-
tions see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/public/staticDisplay.do?id=46&pageRank=9&lang
uage=EN (20. 5. 2009).  
34  For further information see http://curia.europa.eu/en/instit/txtdocfr/index.htm (21. 5. 
2009).  
35 The problematic of visa system, asylum policy and immigration policy were shifted from 
the third pillar to the first.  
36 Further see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html (21. 5. 2009).  
37 For the difference between decision and general decision see above.  
 Petr JeĜábek  Decison-Making under Pillars Two and Three 
Uprava, letnik VII, 4/2009 17 
The general decisions and decisions should be approved unanimously in 
the Council. The initiator may be the Commission or a member state. The 
measures which are necessary to take according to the decision on the level of 
EU are approved by qualified majority (Fiala, Pitrová, 2003, p. 622). The Am-
sterdam Treaty also introduced changes in the institutional scheme of the system. 
The Coordinate committee was kept, as well as the influence of the European 
Commission. On the other hand, the European Parliament was more involved in the 
process of legislation approving.38 The right of Parliament to interpellation and 
discussion with the Council is still valid.39  
The European Court of Justice in Luxembourg gained significant influ-
ence, the right to decide in preliminary questions on the grounds of general 
decisions and decisions. The use of this procedure must be approved by the 
member states in advance (Krej~í, 2001, p. 222). The general decision is con-
sidered as a great achievement of the Amsterdam Treaty. It gives all member 
states the opportunity to influence the implementation of European legislation. 
The same positive view is seen also in context of approving declarations. The 
Council can set a term within which the ratification should be done. But if 
there is no date, then the declaration is valid when it is approved at least by 
the half of the member states (Fiala, Pitrová, 2003, p. 629).  
 
 
6. Decision-making according to the  
Treaty of Nice   
 
The Treaty of Nice40 also introduced a number of changes.41 The main pur-
pose of this Treaty, soon after the Amsterdam Treaty, was to make membership 
possible for countries from central and eastern Europe. 42  This required 
amendments in the mechanism of EU decision-making.  

38 For example the European Parliament has cooperated on the approving of the general 
decisions, decisions or just takes the consultation. 
39 See further: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/public/staticDisplay.do?id=46& 
40 For more information about the Treaty of Nice see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ secretariat _ general/  
41 The Treaty of Nice was signed in February 2001 and came into force in February 2003.  
42 On 1 May 2004 the largest ever enlargement of the European Union took place. Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia became 
the members of the EU. Two and half years later, on 1 January 2007, also Bulgaria and Ro-
mania entered to the EU.    
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The first important change was that the agenda of the defunct European 
Coal and Steel Community was delegated to the European Community (Fiala, 
Pitrová, 2003, p. 163). It also changed the decision-making system. It was 
clear, that the EU with so many members had to be made more effective. This 
led to the introduction of votes by qualified majority, instead of unanimous 
majority (Archer, 2008, p. 36).  
The Treaty introduced the principle of the double majority of member 
states and population. This means that the approval of a draft required the 
votes of 55% of members of the Council of Ministers, representing 62% of EU 
citizens (Chryssouchoou et al., 2003, p. 107). Furthermore, the Treaty raised 
the number of the European Parliament members to 73243 and set the number 
of votes in the European Parliament and Council of Ministers.44 
 
 
7. Decision-making according to the  
Treaty of Lisbon  
  
The new reform treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon45, whose ratification has now 
been completed, adjusts the former European Constitution, which was rejected 
by referendum in France and the Netherlands.47 It comes from the two previ-
ous treaties, from the Treaty on EU (Maastricht Treaty) and the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome).48  

43 For the distribution of the votes between the states see: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
members/ public/geoSearch.do?language=EN (24. 5. 2009). 
44  See further http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=242&lang=EN (25. 5. 
2009).  
45  For the whole reading of the Treaty see http://www.euroskop.cz/gallery/2/737-
ls_pbtisk.pdf (26. 5. 2009). 
46 The Czech Senate ratified the Treaty of Lisbon on 6 May 2009, but the ratification was 
completely finished on 3rd November 2009, when Czech President Václav Klaus signed it. 
Before that he had asked for other conditions, connected with post-war Bene{'s Decrees, 
which were law framework for displacement of Non-Slavic citizens from Czechoslovakia. 
Also Czech Senators had handed a complaint about the Lisbon Treaty to Constitutional 
Court. Irish voters approved the Treaty in Referendum, held on 2 October 2009. One week 
later also Polish President Lech Ka}zynski signed the Treaty.  
47 For the results of referendums see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3954327.stm 
(26. 5. 2009). 
48 See http://www.euroskop.cz/297/sekce/vyjednavani-a-obsah/ (26. 5. 2009).  
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After the rejection of the EU Constitution it took two years Europe to de-
cide how to proceed. The German Presidency and Chancellor Merkel opened 
the theme of European Union future during its presidency in the first half of 2007.49 
It was also one of the priorities of the German Presidency. The first step came with 
the Berlin Declaration, which was signed on the 50th anniversary of the establish-
ment of the European Community.50  
The main difference between the Constitutional Draft and the Lisbon 
Treaty is that the Constitution was intended to replace all other treaties. The 
Lisbon Treaty only adds to and amendment the previous treaties.  
The base of the document is the former Constitution. The present treaty 
is based on the four principles. The first is about more transparency and de-
mocratic Europe. It gives more power to the European Parliament, which is 
considered to be supranational organ, and to national parliaments, which 
should have more power in legislative processes of EU institutions.  
For the European Parliament, which is the only elected institution, it means 
that its position will be more similar to the Council. For the national parliaments it 
then means that they will only have control over whether the European Parliament 
makes decisions in fields which are effective for all of Europe.51  
The second principle deals with a more effective Europe. It simplifies the de-
cision-making mechanisms with the qualified majority voting spread into more 
areas. From 2014 the qualified majority vote will apply according to the double 
majority principle of member states and population. Proposal approval will re-
quire a majority of 55% member states, representing 65% of EU inhabitants. 
There will be also more areas in which qualified majority voting is used.52  
The Treaty also introduces the position of President of the European 
Council, to be elected for a two-and-a-half year term. It also states that there 
should be a direct connection between the results of the elections to the Euro-
pean Parliament and the appointment of the President of the European Commis-
sion. From 2014, the number of European Commissioners was planned to be set 
at two-thirds of EU members, where the European Council could unanimously 

49 For further information about German Presidency see http://www.eu2007.de/de/ (30. 5. 
2009).  
50 The Declaration was signed on 25 March 2007, exact date when the Treaties of Roma 
were signed in 1957. The Berliner Declaration proclaimed to rebuild the European Union till 
the elections to European Parliament in June 2009. Further see:  http://www.eu2007.de/ 
de/News/ Press_ Releases / June/0627AABilanz.html (30. 5. 2009).  
51 Further see http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_cs.htm (30. 5. 2009).  
52 See ibid.  
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decide to change this number. Following the Irish referendum, however, the 
Council decided in December 2008 to retain one Commissioner for one 
state.53  
The third principle is focused on the Europe as an area of freedom, soli-
darity and prosperity. Its main goal is to find the new mechanisms to make 
Europe the area of democracy. The most important part of this is Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which is part of this Treaty.54 The Treaty also strengthens 
the four basic freedoms: freedom of movement for people, goods, services, 
and capital. Of course, it also guarantees the economic, social and political 
rights of the people.55 
The last principle is aimed at making Europe a global player. The High 
Representative for Foreign Policy becomes the vice-chairman of the European 
Commission. The European Union also receives the legal personality which 
makes it strong in a global policy.56  
The other very important part of the Treaty is connected with the pillar 
system. In fact at present time only the first pillar has legal personality. When 
the Lisbon Treaty comes into power, all three pillars will be united under the 
one legal personality, i.e. the European Union.57  
Formally some areas of policy will be also united. The best examples are 
the areas of the free movement of people, visa, asylum and immigration policy 
which are today under the first pillar, and justice and police cooperation in 
criminal law which is today under the third pillar. This change also entails the 
spread of system of qualified majority voting and a stronger position for the 
European Parliament. This agenda will be newly named the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Rights. The cancellation of the pillar structure means that unani-
mous voting will only be used in exceptional cases.58      
 

53 Further see http://euobserver.com/?aid=27265 (21. 10. 2009).  
54 Poland, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom have permanent exemption from 
this part of this Treaty. The Czech President Klaus addressed this exemption for the Czech 
Republic at the beginning of October 2009. The Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has con-
firmed that, if the Czech Republic receives the exemption, Slovakia will request it, but in the 
end he decided not to. Further see http://euobserver.com/18/28850 (20.10.2009).   
55 Further see http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_cs.htm (31. 5. 2009).  
56 See ibid. 
57 Further see http://www.euroskop.cz/gallery/13/4050-kdyz_se_rekne_lisabonska_ 
smlova.pdf (31. 5. 2009).  
58 http://www.euroskop.cz/gallery/13/4050-kdyz_se_rekne_lisabonska_smlova.pdf (1. 6. 
2009).  
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8. Conclusion 

The pillar system of the European Union is very important part of the or-
ganization. It was set up by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, but the first steps 
were made before. The Schengen Agreement which was signed in 1985 firstly 
opened the theme of cooperation in judicial and police affairs.  
 The pillar structure truly developed after 1993 as a way to find a com-
promise between the two concepts of integration – intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism. The first is characterized by the unanimous decision-making 
process. This agenda often includes issues that are very important for member 
states. Within the European Union this involves the second and third pillars. 
The second pillar is focused on the agenda of Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and the third on Justice and Home Affair (JHA), later renamed as 
Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC).  
 The principle of supranationalism involves agenda that are the responsi-
bility of the institutions, i.e. the first pillar in the case of the European Union. 
This system of voting means that the states delegate certain powers to EU 
bodies, in other words they give up some of their own power. The decision-
making process under the theory of supranationalism is more effective and 
more useful for the European Union. 
  In my opinion, both decision-making systems are very useful. Following 
I would like to present some examples of Czech politicians or political parties 
and their opinions on the process of decision-making in the European Union. 
 The first party is the right-wing Civic Democratic Party (ODS) which be-
longs to the conservative branch of political parties. The members called 
themselves the euro-realist party, but according to many political scientists 
they are eurosceptics. Their opinion on the decision-making process in the 
European Union is focused on intergovernmentalism. They consider that the 
European Union has gone too far and now the organization should return to the 
roots, with most matters decided unanimously. For this reason they are 
strongly against the Lisbon Treaty and the Czech Republic was the last country 
to approve the Treaty.  
The second party are Social Democrats (^SSD). They are a typical left-
wing party, more focused on the European affairs. They are strong supporters 
of the Lisbon Treaty because they believe that only strong, stable and unified 
Europe can be successful in competition with other parts of the world. Their 
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opinion on the process of decision-making is more comfortable with theory of 
supranationalism.  
In my opinion both options are needed. The decision-making on the level 
of intergovernmentalism helps protect the national interest of the states.59 If a 
state feels that its interests are threatened then it can apply a veto and block 
negotiations. It also helps protect small states against the larger states, or 
poorer states against the richer. On the other hand it leads to difficulties in 
making any progress. It is also difficult to find a consensus and for this reason 
the results of consultations are not as clear, or in other words it is still often 
possible to find many contrasting views within a supposed agreement.  
The second theory, supranationalism, is more effective. It gives European 
institutions more power to solve the problems facing the continent. I person-
ally think that at present it is the only way to overcome all the problems con-
nected, for example, with the present financial and economical crisis. Looking 
back to the past, each time there has been economical and social problems in 
Europe they have led to political crises. In other words, only a strong and mod-
ern Europe can be successful.  
But supranational mechanism of decision-making also raises some prob-
lems. The first and in my opinion the most important one is connected with 
question of legitimacy. The European Parliament is the only institution directly 
elected by the people.60 The other institutions are then nominated by the gov-
ernments of member states61 or are formed by delegates of the member 
states.62 For example, the Lisbon Treaty attempts to find some connection 
between the results of the elections to the European Parliament and the Euro-
pean Commission. Yet this is probably not enough to increase citizens respect 
for the European institutions.  
 
The paper was written in cooperation with Asst. Prof. Alenka Kuhelj, Ph.D., 
while the author was participating in the Erasmus Programme at the Faculty of 
Administration University of Ljubljana.  

59 One of the examples of the using veto in decision-making in CFSP is Slovenian statement 
on the process of enlargement negotiation with Croatia. Last year, Slovenia decided to use a 
veto against the opening of the other chapters with Croatia until the dispute about the Piran 
Bay is solved.  
60 The first election took place in 1979.  
61 European Commission.  
62 European Council and Council of Ministers. 
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POVZETEK 
 
SPREJEMANJE ODLO^ITEV V SKLADU  
Z DRUGIM IN TRETJIM STEBROM 
  
^lanek obravnava postopek sprejemanja odlo~itev v Evropski uniji po 
sprejetju Maastrichtske pogodbe, ki je pomenila prehod na nadnacionalni 
zna~aj Skupnosti. Po drugi strani pa je ta pogodba prinesla lo~evanje novih 
poslovnikov – skupne zunanje in varnostne politike (SZVP) ter pravosodja in 
notranjih zadev (PNZ), kjer se je ohranil medvladni na~in sprejemanja 
odlo~itev. 
Maastrichtska pogodba je razdelila postopek sprejemanja odlo~itev na 
tri stebre. Prvi steber, ki se osredoto~a na gospodarske in socialne zadeve, 
temelji na na~elu naddržavnosti. Naddržavnost je najbolj u~inkovit sistem 
glasovanja, v katerem je za potrditev nekega osnutka zadostno pridobiti 
ve~ino. 
Za razliko od prvega stebra je sprejemanje odlo~itev, ki temelji na 
medvladnem na~inu odlo~anja, zna~ilno za drugi in tretji steber. V primer-
javi z naddržavnostjo medvladni na~in ve~inoma temelji na glasovalni 
metodi soglasja. Glavni razlog za to je za{~ita nacionalnih interesov držav 
~lanic. Zaradi tega se ta sistem glasovanja uporablja predvsem za pod-
ro~je zunanje politike, varnostne politike ali prava.  
Prav tako lahko prikažemo razlike med naddržavnostjo in medvladnim 
na~inom odlo~anja v Evropskih institucijah. Medtem ko Evropska komisija 
in Evropski parlament pripadata sistemu naddržavnosti, v Evropskem sve-
tu velja medvladni na~in. 
Ko preidemo  na drugi steber, ki zajema podro~je skupne zunanje in 
varnostne politike, lahko opazimo enega najbolj kontroverznih pristopov 
sprejemanja odlo~itev v Evropski uniji. Razlike v mnenjih med državami 
~lanicami na eni strani in zahtevami skupnih stali{~ na drugi so pripeljale 
do kon~ne odlo~itve, da se vzpostavi ta posebni steber.  
Vendar pa so kmalu po vzpostavitvi sistema stebrov države ~lanice in 
Evropske ustanove pri~ele razpravljati o potrebnosti reform na podro~ju 
SZVP. Rezultat teh razprav je vsebovala Amsterdamska pogodba. V skladu 
s tem dokumentom je bil ustanovljen nov urad visokega predstavnika za 
skupno zunanjo in varnostno politiko. Ta sprememba je prinesla ve~ prož-
nosti na odlo~itve v zunanjih in varnostnih zadevah. Evropska unija je bila 
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lahko aktivnej{a v humanitarnih operacijah kot tudi v mirovnih operacijah. 
Prav tako se je okrepilo sodelovanje na podro~ju zmogljivosti skupnih 
enot.  
Splo{ni cilj SZVP je pokriti skupne vrednote, interese in varnost 
Evropske unije in njenih držav ~lanic. Vse to bi morali zagotoviti v razpra-
vah in s sodelovanjem diplomatskih uradov držav ~lanic in Evropskih 
ustanov. Posebno vlogo pri tem igrata dve glavni orodji – skupni ukrepi in 
skupna stali{~a. Glavna razlika med njima je, da skupna stali{~a opredelju-
jejo stali{~a EU na podro~ju zunanje politike in so zavezujo~a za vse države 
~lanice. Skupni ukrepi pa so orodja za aktivno udeležbo EU, kot je sankcioni-
ranje držav ne~lanic ali uporaba opazovalcev med volitvami. 
Amsterdamska pogodba seveda bolj opredeljuje vlogo skupnih stali{~ 
in skupnih ukrepov. Skupno stali{~e je bilo opredeljeno kot konkretno 
stali{~e EU glede tematskih ali geografskih zadev. Skupni ukrepi pa so 
nato opisani kot koraki, ki bi morali biti usmerjeni k re{itvam dolo~enih 
situacij, v katerih je potrebno ukrepanje EU. Amsterdamska pogodba je 
prav tako opredelila novo orodje – skupno strategijo. Skupna strategija naj 
bi aktivirala EU v zadevah, v katerih imajo pomembne skupne interese vse 
države ~lanice. Skupne strategije potrjuje Evropski svet na podlagi pripo-
ro~ila Sveta EU. Svet EU nato s pomo~jo skupnih stali{~ in skupnih ukre-
pov izpelje strategijo v praksi.  
Mehanizem sprejemanja odlo~itev v drugem stebru je bil prav tako 
obnovljen na podlagi Amsterdamske pogodbe. Poleg skupne strategije je 
bila sprejeta posebna vrsta glasovanja, tako imenovani konstruktivni 
zadržek. Z drugimi besedami to pomeni, da so države ~lanice dobile mož-
nost nestrinjanja s konkretno dejavnostjo v SZVP, vendar zaradi tega ne 
blokirajo odlo~itev z vlaganjem veta. Pogodba pravi, da se ~lan Sveta lah-
ko vzdrži glasovanja v skladu s 23. ~lenom Amsterdamske pogodbe. ^e 
katera od držav uporabi pravico neglasovanja in se odlo~itev ne glede na 
to potrdi, morajo vse države ~lanice sprejeti to odlo~itev kot odlo~itev EU.  
Drugi del Maastrichtske pogodbe je povezan z vpra{anji pravosodja in 
notranjih zadev. Pogodba je jasno opredelila podro~je skupnih interesov, 
ki so del tretjega stebra. Ta govori predvsem o problemih azilne politike, 
zunanjih meja in politike priseljevanja, bori se proti prekup~evalcem z 
mamili ter govori o carinskem sodelovanju in sodelovanju policije v boju 
proti terorizmu in organiziranemu kriminalu.  
Sprejemanje odlo~itev na podro~ju tretjega stebra se pri~ne s predla-
ganjem pobude Svetu. V skladu z Maastrichtsko pogodbo lahko osnutek 
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pripravijo države ~lanice ali pa Evropska komisija. Vendar pa ima Evropska 
komisija izlo~itev. Na podro~ju sodelovanja sodi{~, carinskega sodelovanja in 
sodelovanja policije so države ~lanice upravi~ene le do predlaganja osnutka. 
Svet pa je pridobil možnosti sprejemanja skupnih stali{~, skupnih postop-
kov in nato predlaganja kon~ne verzije sporazumov. Skupno stali{~e je 
bilo prvo orodje, ki je bilo ustvarjeno za podporo skupnega upravljanja za 
doseganje ciljev EU. Skupno stali{~e bi morale države ~lanice v mednarodnih 
organizacijah zagovarjati. Pred tem je bila potrebna soglasna odlo~itev Sveta. 
Podro~je pravosodja in notranjih zadev je bilo najbolj pomemben del 
vseh sprememb v Amsterdamski pogodbi. Reforma, ki jo je prinesla 
pogodba, je bolje kategorizirala na~rt tretjega stebra in prenesla del tega 
na~rta na prvi steber. Za to spremembo je bilo dolo~eno prehodno obdob-
je petih let in na~rt je bil preimenovan v Policijsko in pravosodno sodelo-
vanje v kazenskih zadevah. V sklopu tretjega stebra je le podro~je pravo-
sodnega in policijskega sodelovanja. 
Amsterdamska pogodba je obnovila orodja, ki so bila uporabljena 
prej. Svet lahko zavzame skupno stali{~e, sprejme splo{ne odlo~itve in 
odlo~itve ali pa pripravi nekatere dokumente. Takratna novost so bile 
splo{ne odlo~itve in odlo~itve. 
V skladu s Pogodbo v Nici pa so bile sprožene {e druge reforme. Zaradi 
prihajajo~e {iritve na vzhod je bilo nujno potrebno malce spremeniti mehani-
zem sprejemanja odlo~itev v Evropski uniji. Prva pomembna sprememba je 
bila prenos pristojnosti ugasle Evropske skupnosti za premog in jeklo na 
Evropsko skupnost in na mnogih podro~jih je ta za~ela glasovati s kvalifici-
rano ve~ino namesto s soglasno ve~ino. 
Nato je pogodba opredelila na~elo dvojne ve~ine držav ~lanic in pre-
bivalstva. To pomeni, da mora za sprejetje osnutka glasovati 55 % ~lanov 
Sveta ministrov, ki predstavljajo 62 % prebivalstva EU. 
Zadnja sprememba je vsekakor povezana z Lizbonsko pogodbo. Ta 
daje ve~ pristojnosti Evropskemu parlamentu, ki se {teje kot naddržavno 
telo, in državnim parlamentom, ki bi morali imeti ve~ pristojnosti v zako-
nodajnih postopkih in{titucij EU. Prav tako poenostavlja mehanizem spre-
jemanja odlo~itev, ko se bo glasovanje s kvalificirano ve~ino raz{irilo na 
ve~ podro~ij. Od leta 2014 se bo glasovanje s kvalificirano ve~ino {telo 
glede na dvojno ve~ino držav ~lanic in prebivalstva. Za sprejetje predloga 
bo po novem treba dose~i ve~ino 55 % držav ~lanic, ki predstavljajo 65 % 
prebivalstva EU. Prav tako bo ve~ podro~ij, kjer se bo uporabljala kvalifici-
rana ve~ina. Pogodba uvaja položaj predsednika Evropskega sveta. Ta se 
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izvoli za obdobje dveh let in pol. Visoki predstavnik za zunanjo politiko 
postane podpredsednik Evropske komisije. Evropska unija prav tako 
prejme pravno subjektivnost, ki jo v svetovni politiki naredi mo~nej{o. 
Drugi zelo pomemben del te pogodbe je povezan s sistemom stebrov. 
Dejansko je imel le prvi steber pravno osebnost. Ko je Lizbonska pogodba 
stopila v veljavo, so bili vsi trije stebri združeni v eno pravno osebo, ime-
novano Evropska unija. 
 


 
